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UNILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL PREVENTIVE 
SELF-DEFENSE 
Stephanie Be/lier· 
The governing principle of the collective security system created by the United 
Nations Charter in 19451 is the rule prohibiting the use of force in Article 2(4), which 
provides that "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations." 2 
This rule prohibiting the use of force was considered revolutionary at the time 
because it transformed into international law ideas which had for centuries, if not 
millennia, preoccupied the minds of people obliged to accept with fatalism the horrors 
of continual war as a scourge much like the plague or famine which from time to time 
decimated whole populations. 3 
The Charter, however, expressly recognized two exceptions to the rule prohibiting 
the use of force: the right of self-defense permitted by Article 51; and collective action 
against threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression pursuant to 
Chapter VIl. 4 Collective action is to be undertaken and managed by an organ called 
the Security Council. 5 
Thus, beginning in 1945 with the creation of the collective security system, two 
types of rules have coexisted in the international legal order. Some rules are 'relative'; 
they arise out of situational or needs-driven relationships. Other rules are 'institu-
tional'; they arise out of institutional relationships and are based on recognition by 
member states of their common interests. These two types of rules coexist and 
confront each other in a dialectical tension.6 It appears that even today the 'institu-
tional' dimension of international law has not displaced its 'relational' character. 7 
The coexistence of"relational" and "institutional" rules in the international legal 
system of today respects no law of equilibrium-sometimes one type prevails to the 
detriment of the other, and at other times the other type predominates. Ever since the 
• Graduate student, Universite d' Aix-en-Provence. This article has been translated from the French 
by Laura Balladur. 
I. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
2. Id. 
3. JAROSLAV ZOUREK, L'INTERDICTION DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL 43 
(1974). 
4. These measures are found in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which encompasses 
Articles 39 through 51. 
5. The Security Council includes five permanent members with veto rights: China, Great Britain, the 
United States, France, and Russia. See U.N. Charter art. 23, para. I. 
6. Rene Jean Dupuy, Communaute intemationale et disparites de developpement, 165 RECUEIL DES 
COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.O.l.] 21, 46, 49 (1979). 
7. Juan Antonio Carillo-Salcedo, Permanence et mutations en droit international in BOUTROS 
BOUTROS-GHALI, AMICORUM DISCIPULORUMQUE LIBER-PAIX, DEVELOPPEMENT E DEMOCRATIE, 297 
(1999). 
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emergence of new threats to international peace and security it seems that the 
imbalance favors 'relational' rules. In fact, in overturning the traditional paradigms 
of international security by the dissolution of the traditional boundary between 
international security and national security, new threats to the peace have occasioned 
the emergence of state practice that disregards an international legal order which 
regards itself as supranational and supreme. Some states have recently reminded the 
world that in 1945 they did not abandon their right to have recourse to the use of force, 
one of sovereignty's essential attributes. They merely gave the impression of doing so. 
These new threats to international peace and security consist mainly of terrorism 
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 8 Actually, these threats are not 
new; terrorism, for instance, has always existed. 9 But they are considered new because 
they characterize the threats of the twenty-first century and are distinct from the Soviet 
threat that existed for almost fifty years, which was military and conventional. In 
contrast, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction are asymmetrical threats. The 
concept of'asymmetrical threats' was invented by the United States 10 to describe a new 
type of threat or non-conventional warfare challenging western supremacy. This type 
of warfare includes three distinct elements that are sometimes superimposed on each 
other: asymmetric actors, asymmetric goals, and asymmetric means. This new type of 
warfare is also characterized by a different relation to space. 11 Asymmetric warfare 
seeks to convert the enemy's strength into weakness, and is, therefore, especially 
focused on manipulating information and communication. Whereas conventional 
warfare pursues strategic objectives ofa material nature (like the conquest of territory, 
etc.), asymmetrical warfare pursues strategic objectives which often are of an 
immaterial nature, with an emphasis on legitimacy. In other words, asymmetrical 
strategies aim more to influence and to change minds than to conquer. Appearing in 
the early 1990s, these new threats drastically disrupted the international order on 
September 11, 200 l . 
On September 11, 200 l, a single image played over and over on television screens 
throughout the world: the collapse of the twin towers of the World Trade Center in 
New York. The scene seemed right out of a science-fiction movie, yet it was real. For 
the first time since 1812, the American national territory had been attacked. 12 Within 
8. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represents one of the most serious threats to 
humanity. President of the Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council, delivered to 
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/23500 (Jan. 31, 1992). 
9. Judge Gilbert Guillaume has given a commonly accepted definition of terrorism: ''Terrorism implies 
the use of force in situations whose nature endangers a person's life or their physical integrity within the 
context of an enterprise whose goal is to provoke terror in order to bring about certain ends." Gilbert 
Guillaume, Te"orisme et droit intemationale, 215 R.C.A.D.I. 306 (1989). 
10. The Quadrennial Defense Review introduced the notion of "asymmetrical threats" in 1997. 
"Asymmetry" must be made distinct from "dissymmetry," which indicates a quantitative difference between 
the numbers or strength of combatants. See generally DEP'T OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 
REPORT (2001), available at www.defenselink.miVpubs/qdrl. 
11. On an operational level, the traditional battlefield has given way to an operational space, which can 
be defined as the area in which security and military operations are undertaken. It encompasses the tradi-
tional three dimensional space where operations are physically undertaken, as well as the domain of elec-
tronic warfare, cyberspace. Cyberspace refers to the "infosphere" where numerical information circulates 
and opinions are manipulated, creating subtle interactions that are at the heart of modem security problems. 
12. The September 11, 2001 attacks have often been compared to the December 7, 1941 Japanese 
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a few minutes, two American commercial airliners crashed into the World Trade 
Center towers and a third into the Pentagon near Washington, D.C. 13 It was a terrorist 
attack orchestrated by Osama bin Laden. On September 14, 200 I, an America, still 
burying its dead, announced through the voice of its forty-third president, George W. 
Bush, that: "War has been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. This 
nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. This conflict was begun on the 
timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing." 14 
The United States declared war. 15 On October 6, 2001, the United States 
intervened militarily in Afghanistan, a country accused of harboring terrorists. The 
operation was initially called Infinite Justice, and then re baptized Enduring Freedom. 
It was presented as an exercise of the United States' right of self-defense under Article 
51 of the U.N. Charter in response to an armed aggression-the 9/1 l terrorist attacks 
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon: 
In response to these attacks, and in accordance with the inherent right of individual 
and collective self-defence, United States armed forces have initiated actions designed 
to prevent and deter further attacks on the United States. These actions include 
measures against Al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan. 16 
The international community as a whole approved the United States' argument. 17 
The European Union itself had already given its support a few weeks prior to the 
intervention: 
The European Council is totally supportive of the American people in the face of the 
deadly terrorist attacks. These attacks are an assault on our open, democratic, tolerant 
and multicultural societies. They are a challenge to the conscience of each human 
being. The European Union will cooperate with the United States in bringing to 
justice and punishing the perpetrators, sponsors and accomplices of such barbaric 
acts. 18 
But once the intervention in Afghanistan was over, the United States discovered 
another regime capable of threatening international peace and security. On September 
12, 2002, a year and a day after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
attack of the American Navy at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Close to 2400 American sailors were killed during 
this attack. See generally ALAN SCHOM, THE EAGLE AND THE RISING SUN: THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN WAR, 
1941-1943, PEARL HARBOR THROUGH GUADALCANAL (2004). 
13. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, available at http://www.9-llcommission.gov/report/ 
91 !Report.pdf. 
14. George Walker Bush, President's Remarks at National Day of Prayer and Remembrance (Sept. 14, 
200 I), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/200 I 0914-2.html. 
15. S.J. Res. 23, I 07th Cong. (200 I), available at http://www.senate.gov. 
16. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the President of the 
United Nations Security Council, ,i 4, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001), available at 
http://www.un.int.usa/s-2001-946.html. 
17. Only a few States considered the U.S.-led actions in Afghanistan to be contrary to international law. 
These States were Belarus, Brazil, North Korea, Cuba, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Malaysia, Qatar, Syria, 
Vietnam, and Yemen. 
18. Extraordinary European Council Meeting, Conclusions and Plan of Action (EC) (Sept. 21, 200 I), 
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal_ relations/cfsp/doc/concl_ 21 _ 09 _ 0 J .htm./. 
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Pentagon, President Bush delivered a speech to the United Nations General Assembly 
in which he portrayed Iraq, and more specifically Saddam Hussein, as a grave threat 
to the peace. 19 The Iraqi regime seemingly was refusing to fulfill its international 
obligations: specifically, its obligations to disarm and to dispose ofits weapons of mass 
destruction. President Bush exhorted world leaders to act in order to compel Iraq to 
live up to its responsibilities. 20 He called on Saddam Hussein to "immediately and 
unconditionally foreswear, disclose and remove or destroy all weapons of mass 
destruction. "21 On September 16, 2002, a few days after this directive, in a letter to the 
United Nations Secretary General, Iraq announced that it accepted unconditionally the 
return of United Nations arms inspectors. 22 But on September 24, 2002, British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair made public a British secret service report according to which the 
Iraqi regime "continues to develop weapons of mass destruction" and would soon be 
able to build a short-range nuclear weapon.23 These findings led the U.S. Congress to 
authorize the unilateral use of force against Iraq.24 On November 8, 2002, the U.N. 
Security Council reacted to these events by adopting Resolution 1441, 25 which ordered 
Saddam Hussein to eliminate all his programs for the development and production of 
weapons of mass destruction. Iraq complied with this Resolution on December 7, 
2002, by providing a report of its weapons programs to U.N. weapons inspectors. 26 In 
spite of the well-publicized efforts of the Iraqi regime to comply with Resolution 1441, 
the Bush administration made increasingly clear its intention to intervene militarily in 
Iraq, regardless of the findings of chiefU.N. weapons experts Hans Blix and Mohamed 
El Baradei. Indeed, throughout February 2003, they had repeatedly asserted in the 
Security Council that "UNMOVIC did not find evidence of the continuation or 
resumption of programmes of weapons of mass destruction. "27 Nevertheless, on March 
17, 2003, President Bush stated that ''the Security Council has not lived up to its 
responsibilities" 28 and that Iraq still has weapons of mass destruction. As a result, on 
March 20, 2003, Iraq was bombed with authorization from the Security Council. 
19. George Walker Bush, Speech to the United Nations, Delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
Af57/PV.2 (Sept. 12, 2002). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Letter from the U.N. Secretary General to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2002/1034 (Sept. 16, 2002). 
23. JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITIEE, IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: THE AsSESSMENT OF 
BRITTSH GoVERNMENT (2002) (U.K.), available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/iraqdossier.pdf. 
24. H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong. (2002) (authorizing President Bush to use military force against Iraq 
ifneeded), available at http://www.house.gov/. This was adopted on October IO and 11, 2002, by the two 
Houses and signed by the President on October 16, 2002. 
25. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002). 
26. The Secretary General, Twelfth Quarterly Report oft he Executive Chairman of the United Nations 
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in Accordance with Paragraph 12 of Security 
Council Resolution 1284 ( 1999), delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/232 (Feb. 28, 2003). 
27. The Secretary General, Thirteenth Quarterly Report of the Executive Chairman of the United 
Nations Monitoring, Verification and inspection Commission in Accordance with Paragraph 12 of 
Security Council Resolution 1284 (I 999), U.N. Doc. S/2003/580, 5 (May 30, 2003). 
28. George Walker Bush, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation (Mar. 17, 2003), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html. 
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This intervention did not occur without strong opposition from many states. 
Indeed, throughout the negotiations concerning the intervention in Iraq, many states 
opposed war, favoring increased reliance on the inspection system. Because of its 
outspoken position on this question, France emerged as spokesman for the opposition 
to the war option. This gave rise to serious political tension between France and the 
United States. 
France firmly rejected the idea of military intervention in Iraq, considering that 
even if Iraq had to be disarmed, the country posed no direct threat to international 
peace and security. Moreover, even if France were mistaken about the danger posed 
by Iraq, only the Security Council was authorized to use force against it. At this 
juncture France assumed a unique role, both within the European Union and in relation 
to the United States, which began before American military intervention in Iraq and 
continued during and after it. France rejected the idea of an Iraq war waged by a 
coalition of states, declaring that it "attaches importance to the principle of collective 
security .... The Iraqi question cannot be an exception." 29 Subsequently, as voiced by 
its then Minister of Foreign Affairs Dominique de Villepin, France stated that "no 
single country has the means to build Iraq's future. Above all, no State can claim the 
necessary legitimacy. The legal and moral authority for such an undertaking can stem 
only from the United Nations." 3° France considered it necessary to give inspections 
a chance first, as these had been resumed in September 2002, following President 
Bush's speech to the General Assembly. More specifically, French President Jacques 
Chirac believed that inspectors should be allowed the necessary time to carry out their 
mission, in accordance with the recommendations of the chief U.N. weapons 
inspectors. Hans Blix and Mohamed El Baradei did in fact feel that their work in Iraq 
had progressed, despite obstacles created by the government of Saddam Hussein. A 
few days before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, French President Jacques Chirac 
firmly asserted: "My position is that whatever the circumstances may be, France will 
vote no because [this evening] it considers that there is no good reason to wage a war 
to obtain the objective to which we are committed." 31 Because of its position, France 
became for Washington in turn a "stooge, scapegoat, sacrificial lamb, fall guy, black 
sheep-terms not mutually exclusive, and which would not necessarily stand in the 
way of limited cooperation with Paris." 32 
The United States and France have long been in opposition on the question of 
Iraq, on the appropriate way to respond to the new threats to the peace, and as a result 
on how to read the U.N. Charter. 33 It is undeniable that the Charter has been 
29. Jean-Davide Levitte, Speech to the U.N. Security Council, 5 U.N. Doc. S/PV.4625 (Oct. 17, 2002) 
(emphasis added). 
30. Dominic de Villepin, Speech to the U.N. SecurityCouncil,6 U.N. Doc. S/PV.4721 (Mar.19,2003) 
(emphasis added). 
31. Press Release from Jacques Chirac, President ofFrance (Feb. 17, 2003). 
32. Justin Vaisse, Le Nouvel age postal/antique, 103 COMMENTAIRE 541,544 (Fall 2003). 
33. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, L 'Unite de /'ordrejuridique international, 297 R.C.A.D.1. 222-23 (2002). 
The Charter is no longer only a constitution, setting forth rights and obligations as well as 
allocating jurisdiction. More specifically, although it is a highly normative text, it is also 
a text for which it could be said the norms are entered in 'double entry' bookkeeping, that 
is to say, according to a double register of norms: on one side legal, on the other side, 
ideological and political. Ranging in this way over the full field of law, the Charter can 
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undermined by the actions of a few U .N. member states with respect to the intervention 
in Iraq. The Anglo-American military action of March 20, 2003, was neither an act of 
self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter nor an act stricto sensu pursuant to 
Chapter VII. 
Self-defense became an autonomous legal concept with the signing of the Kellogg-
Briand Pact on August 26, 1928, which prohibited the use of force, although making 
an exception for self-defense. Article 51 of the Charter incorporates the right ofself-
defense. It provides: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this 
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall 
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under 
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.34 
A reading of Article 51 reveals that the right of a state to use force in self-defense 
must satisfy three conditions. First, the right is only temporary; it terminates once the 
Security Council has ''taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security." The second refers to the supervision that is to be exercised by the Security 
Council. 35 The third condition is a sine qua non and, therefore, a substantive condition. 
The use of force in self-defense is permitted only if the state employing force was the 
object of an armed attack on its territory. This was certainly not the case with respect 
to the American intervention in Iraq. 
Moreover, use of force under Chapter VII's provisions for collective action in the 
face of a threat to the peace is only authorized if the Security Council, after having 
determined that there exists a threat to international peace and security, deems military 
intervention necessary. 36 This procedure is based on the traditional idea ofinternational 
solidarity. The American action in Iraq was not authorized in this manner. 37 
Id. 
appear as archetypal Law. . . . Regardless of the faith it appears to uphold or create, 
however, the essence of a foundational text is to assign for its flock a demanding ideal, 
something that will mobilize the flock yet remain largely inaccessible .... The text thus 
accommodates itself to a certain measure of infidelity from its followers, because it is in its 
nature to invite them to rise above themselves in a way that the authors know in advance is 
not completely possible .... [In like fashion] the Charter is thus constantly exposed ... to 
abnegation by its members' acts. 
34. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
35. For a complete study, see D.W. Greig, Self-defense and the Security council: What does Article 
51 require?, 40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 366 (1991); Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Le Controle par le Consei/ 
de Securite des actes de /egitime defense, in COLLOQUE DE LA SOCIETE FRAN<;:AIS DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL: LE CHAPITRE VII DE LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIS 59 (1995). 
36. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
3 7. As Charles de Visscher reminds us: 
In the State it is the vital interests, the most highly political, that evoke the supreme 
solidarities. The opposite is the case in the international community. There one observes 
minor solidarities of an economic or technical order, for example; but the nearer one 
approaches vital questions, such as the preservation of peace and prevention of war, the less 
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How then should the American intervention in Iraq be characterized? It is within 
this chaotic universe of legal definition that the concept of preventive self-defense 
emerges. The substitution of"threat" for "armed attack" (that is, a response no longer 
to force but to the threat of force) as the legal basis for the use of force has made an 
uninvited appearance in international legal doctrine. But international law is first and 
foremost the law of states. And states still do surprising things. The substitution of 
"threat" for "armed attack"-also termed "preventive self-defense"-is one such 
surprise. 
In preventive self-defense ''the burden of proof is inverted: an armed attack is no 
longer the critical determinant ... [R]ather countering its preparation by any means 
possible, including the use of force, becomes legitimate .... "38 Preventive self-defense 
is thus understood as an armed action in reaction to a potential threat. It is different 
from preemptive self-defense ( also known as anticipatory self-defense) which instead 
is the use of force in reaction to an imminent threat. 39 As explained in a recent report: 
In the case of preventive action, however, the threat is more remote. Action is taken 
at an earlier stage than in the case of pre-emptive action so as to ensure that the threat 
in question does not evolve into an imminent attack. Moreover, the term 'preventive 
action' also frequently relates to a much wider range of measures (including non-
military measures) that can be used to thwart an attack.40 
It would appear that the U.S.-led armed action can be categorized as preventive 
self-defense. Faced with this claim, it seems advisable to heed the advice of Patrick 
Daillier, who asks us ''to resist the 'temptation' to reopen the question of defining self-
defense so as not to encourage uncertainty and the decline in the influence of 
international law on the conduct of international relations. "41 Yet the United States has 
already called into question the doctrine of self-defense. So how can we not reconsider 
influence the community has on its members. Solidarities diminish as the perils threatening 
it grow. The solidarities that then assert themselves tum back towards their traditional 
home, the nation. On the rational plane, men [do] not deny the existence of supranational 
values; in the sphere of action they rarely obey any but national imperatives. 
CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PuBLIC INTERNATIONAL LA w 90-91 (P.E. Corbett trans. 
1968). 
38. Eric Remacle, Vers un multilatera/isme en reseau comme instrument de la lutte contre le 
terrorisme?, in LEDROITINTERNATIONALFACEAUTERRORISME, 17 CAHIERSINTERNATIONAIJX, 331, 337-
38 (Karine Bannelier et al. eds., 2002). 
39. Defined by Michael Kelly as the: 
precept that if a State is about to be invaded, it may attack the invading force before the 
actual invasion has begun in order to stave off the imminent attack or otherwise ameliorate 
the effects of it. Unlike its doctrinal cousin, traditional self-defense, the State under 
imminent threat of attack is not required to absorb the first blow before responding with 
military force. 
Michael J. Kelly, Time Warp to 1945-Resurrection of the Reprisal and Anticipatory Self-Defense 
Doctrine in International Law, 13 J. TRANSNAT'L . & POL'Y 1, 22 (2003) (emphasis added). 
40. JOINT REPORT BY ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL FFAIRS AND ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
ON isSUES OF Pl.JBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION 5 (2004 ). 
41. Patrick Daillier, Les Nations Unies et la legitime defense, in LES NATIONS UNIES ET 
L'AFGHANISTANT 107, 109 (2003). 
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it? To do so, we must focus on the fundamental question: does the U.N. Charter 
provide for preventive self-defense? 42 
According to international legal doctrine, there are two answers to this question, 
because there are two possible readings of Article 51 as it relates to preventive self-
defense. Some think that the right of preventive self-defense is contained in Article 51. 
Partisans of this conception believe that the adjective "inherent," which modifies the 
right of self-defense, implies the existence of a customary right of preventive self 
defense, which is thereby preserved in Article 51. Supporters of such a reading include 
Anthony Clark Arend, Robert Beck, Derek William Bowett, John Alan Cohan, Myres 
McDougal, Robert O'Brien, Julius Stone, Oscar Schachter, and Sir Humphrey 
Waldock. This is definitely a minority view. The majority, however, insist on a 
restrictive reading of Article 51, focusing on the terms "if an armed attack occurs," to 
argue that the use of force in self-defense is only possible in response to an armed 
attack and therefore prohibits preventive self-defense. Defenders of this position 
include Ian Brownlie, Anthony D' Amato, Yorem Dinstein, Michael Glennon, Louis 
Henkinb, Philip Jessup, Hans Kelsen, Hilaire McCoubrey and William Burke-White, 
Sean Murphy, Lassa Oppenheim, and Bruno Simrna.43 
Even though preventive self-defense is not expressly provided for in the Charter, 
states have invoked and used it on many occasions in the past. The first invocation of 
the right of preventive self-defense was by the United States during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis of 1962. In May 1962, Nikita Khruschev decided to deploy intermediate-range 
ballistic missiles in Cuba. 44 A deployment in Cuba would have greatly increased Soviet 
strategic capacity and would have provided a formidable deterrent against an American 
attack on the Soviet Union. For the United States, the crisis started on October 15, 
1962, when military photographs revealed the assembling of Soviet missiles in Cuba. 
Early the next day, President Kennedy was informed of the discovery of the Soviet 
installations. The crisis officially began on October 22, 1962, when President Kennedy 
announced the discovery of the missiles to the public. The next day, after demanding 
that the Soviet Union cease these activities, President Kennedy, considering that the 
Soviet position was "a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status 
quo," ordered "a naval blockade (a quarantine) so that the Soviet Union could not 
42. See Timothy L.H. McCornack, Anticipatory Self-Defense in the Legislative History of the United 
Nations Charter, 25 ISR. L. REV. I (1991). 
43. "Restrictionists" view Article 51 as a limit on customary international law. Kelly, supra note 39, 
at 23. "Counter-restrictionists" view Article 51 as incorporating customary law as it existed in 1945, rather 
than being a limit on customary international law. Id. Alternatively, they argue that the development of 
nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, in combination with a reading of Article 51, 
inevitably leads to a right to anticipatory self-defense "as a practical matter." Id. 
44. In his speech of October 23, 1962, President Kennedy described the missiles in Cuba: 
The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two distinct types of installations. 
Several of them include medium range ballistic missiles, capable of carrying a nuclear 
warhead for a distance of more than 1,000 nautical miles. Each of these missiles, in short, 
is capable of striking Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico City, 
or any other city in the southeastern part of the United States, in Central America or in the 
Caribbean area. 
John F. Kennedy, Speech to the American Public (Oct. 22, 1962), available at http://www.cnn.com/ 
SPECIALS/cold. war/episodes/I 0/docurnents/kennedy.speech/. 
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transport the material to Cuba." 45 President Kennedy explained that he was acting "in 
defense of our security and of the entire Western Hemisphere.'"' 6 
Israel has also invoked the argument of preventive self-defense on several 
occasions. The first time was on October 29, 1956, when Israel launched a military 
operation in the Sinai, which was in Egyptian territory. Israel presented its military 
intervention as a response to Egyptian aggression, which, in its view, took three forms. 
First, a naval blockage established by the Egyptian government whereby Israeli ships 
were forbidden to transit the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Straits ofTiran; 
second, a wave of attacks on Israeli territory since 1955 by fedayeen from Egypt; and 
third, a serious risk of an imminent attack by Egyptian armed forces. 47 In 1967, at the 
time of the Six-Day War, Israel again invoked the doctrine of preventive self-defense. 
Following the withdrawal of the United Nations forces,48 which had been stationed on 
Egyptian territory since 1956, Egyptian President Nasser closed the Gulf of Aqaba to 
Israeli ships. In response, on June 5, 1967, Israel invaded the Sinai, considering that 
it had been "attacked" by the Egyptian measure. Israel again invoked the preventive 
self-defense argument three times: on the occasions ofits raid on Palestinian camps in 
Lebanon in December 197 5, its air strike on Iraq's Osiriq nuclear reactor in June 1981, 
and its raid on P.L.O. headquarters in Tunis in 1985. 
How did United Nation's organs respond when confronted with the position of 
some states that the doctrine of preventive self-defense justified the use of force in 
certain situations? The Security Council and the International Court of Justice have 
both strictly prohibited the use of the doctrine. 49 The Security Council took a clear 
position for the first time in its Resolution 487 of June 10, 1981, following Israel's 
strike on Iraq's Osiriq nuclear reactor. 50 The Security Council "strongly condemns the 
military attack by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the 
norms ofinternational conduct," and "calls upon Israel to refrain in the future from any 
such acts or threats thereof." 51 
The International Court of Justice has adopted a position similar to that of the 
Security Council. 52 It does not recognize preventive self-defense. Only an armed 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. S/PV/745 § 36 (Oct. 25, 1956). Tel-Aviv justified the intervention, because "the patience and 
exemplary moderation that Israel has shown during many months went above and beyond that which the 
obligations of a sovereign state require a state endowed with the inalienable right of legitimate defense." 
Id. 
48. G.A. Res. 1000 (ES-I) (Nov. 5, 1956) (creating the Emergency Force of the United Nations, 
charged with enforcing the convention of armistice and overseeing the cessation of hostilities). 
49. See generally Louis B. Sohn, The International Court of Justice and the Scope of the Right ofSelf-
Defense and the Duty of Non Intervention, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY, ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF SHABT AI ROSENNE (Y oram Dinstein, ed., I 989). 
50. S.C. Res. 487, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981). On the question of the Security Council and 
preventive self-defense, see Antonio Cassese, Article 51, in LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES: 
COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE 771 (Jean Pierre Cot & Alain Pellet, eds., 2d ed. 1991). 
51. S.C. Res. 487, supra note 50, at ffll 1-2. 
52. A doubt may have existed as to the position of the International Court of Justice after the Corfa 
Channel decision. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.CJ. 4 (April 9). See Ronald St. John 
Macdonald, L 'Emploi de la force par /es Etats en droit international, in DROIT INTERNATIONAL-BILAN ET 
PERSPECTNES 775 (Mohammed Bedjaoui, ed. 1991). 
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attack and it alone justifies the use of force in self-defense under Article 51 of the 
Charter. The Court made its position clear in its Nicaragua decision of 1986, 53 which 
it reaffirmed in its Oil Platforms decision of2003. 54 The Court also addressed the issue 
in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons. 55 In Nicaragua, the Court declared: "[T]he lawfulness of the use of force by 
a State in response to a wrongful act of which it has not itself been the victim is not 
admitted when this wrongful act is not an armed attack." 56 In Oil Platforms, the Court 
reaffirmed its position: 
[T]he United States was only entitled to recourse to force under the provision in 
question if it was acting in self defense. The Court adds that the United States could 
exercise such a right of self-defense only if it had been the victim of an armed attack 
by Iran and makes it clear that, in that case, the United States' actions must be 
necessary and proportional to the armed attack against it. 57 
In its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
the question of self-defense and implementation was not expressly included in the legal 
question posed to the Court by the General Assembly and the World Health 
Organization, but the Court decided to examine it because of its link to the question of 
the use of armed force. The portions of the opinion dealing with self-defense are 
ambiguous. They can be interpreted either as authorizing or as denying the use of 
preventive force. The Court emphasized that it "cannot lose sight of the fundamental 
right of every State to survival, and thus its right to resort to self-defense, in 
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, when its survival is at stake. "58 With its 
reference to "survival at stake," some have interpreted this opinion as implicitly 
recognizing the right of preventive self-defense. But, by referring expressly to Article 
51 of the Charter, and as a partisan of a strict reading of the Charter, the Court actually 
appears to reject any right of preventive self-defense. 
Why then is the doctrine of preventive self-defense so alive today? Why did the 
United States invoke and defend it despite the strong opposition of states like France? 
What is the situation or fact that explains the revival of a concept that was once thought 
to be obsolete? The situation is the new threat to the peace; the fact is September 
l lth. 59 How should we think of preventive self-defense from now on? As an effective 
response to new threats to the peace, but forbidden by the U.N. Charter? In fact the 
53. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
54. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.CJ. 161 (Nov. 6). 
55. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 19961.C.J. 2 (July 8). 
56. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 19861.C.J. 14, 110 (June 27). 
57. Press Release 2003/38, International Court of Justice, Oil Platforms (Nov. 6, 2003), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org. 
58. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. l, 33 (July 8). 
59. See, e.g., Lucy Martinez, September 11th, Iraq and the Doctrine of Anticipatory Self-Defense, 72 
UMKC L. REV. 123, 147 (2003-2004) (stating "at the international level, the events of September 11 have 
revealed at least one facet of the new reality of our international system, or at [least] one facet of our new 
understanding of the reality of our international system. Only one superpower means only one [main] 
target, and that target, like most States, was shown on September 11 to be achingly vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks. Inevitably, this has Jed to a questioning of previously fundamental and foundational beliefs relating 
to the use of force .... "). 
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Charter does not forbid all acts of preventive self-defense. The Charter, too, still 
surprises. 
In reality there exist two types of preventive self-defense: one implicitly forbidden 
by the Charter and the other explicitly authorized by it. The first, or forbidden, type is 
that which is implemented unilaterally by states outside of the U.N. framework. It is 
prohibited by the Charter and thus is in no way capable of being considered as an 
exception to the rule prohibiting the use of force, but rather as a violation of this rule. 
The second type is, on the contrary, expressly authorized by Chapter VII of the 
Charter. It is activated by the Security Council alone in the case of a threat to the 
peace and it falls within a multilateral framework. A threat to the peace in and ofitself 
suffices to justify action by the Security Council. The first type of preventive self-
defense is unilateral; the second is multilateral. United States action in intervening in 
Iraq, citing a threat to the peace, illustrates the first type of preventive self-defense. On 
the other side of the Atlantic, France was exhausting itself by repeatedly emphasizing 
the traditional role of the Security Council, that ofintervening in cases of threats to the 
peace, even new ones. 
I. UNIJ.A TERAL ( OR AMERICAN) PREVENTIVE ACTION 
When it adopted its new security doctrine in September 2002, the United States 
confirmed the opinion of some that it has never really been committed to the 
suppression ofwar. 60 
A. The New United States Security Doctrine 
The official document outlining new U.S. security doctrine is entitled National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America. 61 Until September 11, 2001, the 
United States was concerned with Homeland Defense. 62 Homeland Defense has been 
defined by the Department of Defense as ''the protection of the territory, the 
60. See, e.g., Maurice Bourquin, Le Probleme de la securite intemationale, 49 R.C.A.D.I. 524,526 
(1969) (stating "[n]either North America nor Latin America have ever shown any inclination toward the 
suppression of war ... In their eyes, preventive action is a more practical resource than punishment of the 
aggressor."). 
61. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002), 
available athttp://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. Two other documents reveal the direction of positions 
taken by the administration of George W. Bush on national security. The first document, drafted by 
Pentagon officials under the Secretary of Defense in close consultation with the U.S. President, is called 
the Quadrennial Defense Review Report. DEP'TOF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPoRT (200 I), 
available at http://www.pdgs.org.ar/featured/fea-usa-indice.htm. The second document, the Nuclear 
Posture Review, is an audit of U.S. nuclear strategy and weapons produced by the Pentagon at the Senate's 
request. DEP'T OF DEF., NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW REPORT (2001 ). This document is classified, but the 
forward by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
news/Jan2002/d2002019npr.pdf. Excerpts from the report are available at http://globalsecurity.org/ 
wind/library/policy/dod/npr.htm. 
62. David Grondin, Penser la strategie americaine de la securite du territaire national, 4 ANNuAJRE 
FRANCAIS DE RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES (A.F.R.I.) 613,616 (2003); see generally Steven J. Tomisek, 
Homeland Security: The New Role/or Defense, 189 STRATEGIC FORUM I (2002). 
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sovereignty, the population, and the critical infrastructure of the United States against 
external threats and aggression.''63 
In the aftermath of9/l l, the talk is only of Homeland Security.64 The Department 
of Defense's official definition of Homeland Security is: ''the preparation for, pre-
vention of, defense against, and response to threats and aggressions directed towards 
U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure; as well as crisis 
management, consequence management, and other domestic civil support. "65 Home-
land Security is a security strategy for the national territory that embodies the formula-
tion and operationalizing of the U.S. response to internal and external terrorism. 66 
Homeland Security is inseparable from a national security strategy. Indeed, the U.S. 
understands that a Homeland Security strategy facilitates the development of a better 
integrated national security strategy and permits a wide-ranging defense of the national 
territory, concerning itself both with non-state actors and with the states that harbor 
them.67 
The National Security Strategy of the United States is a document that gathers 
together a number of speeches delivered by President George W. Bush between 
September 2001 and September 2002 on the priorities of his administration with 
respect to security matters.68 The most important speech is that delivered on June 1, 
2002, at West Point.69 Consisting of nine chapters, the National Security Strategy 
dedicates three chapters to preventive self-defense. 70 In these three chapters, the Bush 
administration arrogates to itself the right to anticipatory military intervention 71 against 
states or terrorist actors suspected of trying to acquire or of possessing weapons of 
63. Grondin, supra note 62, at 616; Tomisek, supra note 62, at 4. 
64. The expression Homeland Security was suggested by the U.S. Commission on National 
Security/21st Century ( commonly known as the Hart-Rudman Task Force on Homeland Security) created 
by President Bill Clinton in 1998. Grondin, supra note 62, at 615. This bipartisan commission, co-chaired 
by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, drafted three reports in 1999, 2000, and 2001, in 
which the concept of homeland security was made official Id. These are New World Coming: American 
Security in the 21st Century (Sept. 15, 1999), Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert/or Preserving 
Security and Promoting Freedom (Sept. 15, 2000), and Road Map for National Security: Imperative for 
Change (Feb. 15, 200 I). Grondin, supra note 62, at n.6 I 5, available at http:/ /www.fas.org/man/docs/nwc/. 
65. Tomisek, supra note 62, at 4. 
66. Grondin, supra note 62, at 617. 
67. Id. 
68. Bernard Sionneau claims that the initiatives proposed in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report 
(200 I), Nuclear Posture Review (200 I) and National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
(2002) were formulated between spring 1997 and September 2000 in the Project for The New American 
Century, available at http://newarnericancentury.org. Bernard Sionneau, Reseaux conservateurs et 
nouvelle doctrine americaine de securite, 4 A.F.R.I., 498, 508 (2003). 
69. George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States 
Military Academy West Point, (June I, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2002/06/20020601-3 .html. 
70. Chapter I presents an Overview of America's International Strategy; chapter ill describes how to 
Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our 
Friends; and chapter V relates to those measures that will Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our 
Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY] pdf 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. 
71. The expression "anticipatory self-defense" allows two types of self-defense identified in the 
chapters on strategy to be joined: preventive and preemptive self-defense. 
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mass destruction for use against American interests. Sometimes the document refers 
to preventive self-defense, sometimes it refers to preemptive self-defense. 
The Strategy's preamble first refers to preventive self-defense: 
And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such 
emerging threats before they are folly formed. We cannot defend America and our 
friends by hoping for the best. So we must be prepared to defeat our enemies' plans, 
using the best intelligence and proceeding with deliberation. History will judge 
harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have 
entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action. 72 
Chapter I reiterates this approach: 
The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American interna-
tionalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of 
this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better .... To achieve these 
goals, the United States will ... strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and 
work to prevent attacks against us and our friends. 73 
Chapters III and V, however, which address the measures needed to prevent an 
enemy of the United States and its allies from threatening them with weapons of mass 
destruction, interject difficulties by speaking in terms of preemption. Chapter III, for 
example, refers to both preventive and preemptive self-defense: 
defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and 
abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While 
the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international 
community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-
defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing 
harm against our people and our country.74 
Chapter V reads in part as follows: 
The United States has Jong maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a 
sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk 
of inaction-and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to 
defend ourselves, even ifuncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's 
attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States 
will, if necessary, act preemptively." 
From then on, the Bush administration has been seen as confusing prevention with 
preemption, 76 and what is more, equating the notion of prevention with that of 
preemption. 77 Prevention and preemption, however, refer to two quite different 
72. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 70, at preamble (emphasis added}. 
73. Id. at I (emphasis added}. 
74. Id. at 6 (emphasis added}. 
75. Id. at 15 (emphasis added}. 
76. The French seem to use the term ''preemption" only in its original sense, that is, the right of 
acquisition. American military strategy language introduced the distinction between preemption and 
prevention, which the Bush Administration disregards. 
77. See generally Ivo H. Daalder, L 'Emploi de lo force dans un monde en chongement, 4 A.F.R.1. 215 
(2003). 
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realities. Preemption refers to an attack on an adversary who is preparing to strike, 
while prevention is an action undertaken to prevent a threat from materializing. In 
other words, preventive strikes are launched cold, while preemptive strikes are in 
response to a clear and immediate threat. The actions described in Chapters III and IV 
as preemptive are, in reality, preventive. 
It would seem, however, that rather than confusing preemption and prevention, the 
Bush administration actually uses the two terms interchangeably, without concern for 
the nuances of meaning that distinguish them. The objective of the Bush Strategy is 
simple, and can be met just as well by legitimacy based on a preventive or a preemp-
tive justification: to claim for itself the right to attack in the case of a mere threat. The 
justification advanced is that the unique characteristics of new forms of threats to the 
peace, such as terrorism, require the changes to traditional means of defense. 78 
The doctrine of anticipatory self-defense has been invoked as an important tool 
in an age of weapons of mass destruction. 79 But what are the foundations of this new 
doctrine? The United States has been accused of reincorporating the old "just war" 
doctrine into contemporary models of international security by invoking preventive 
self-defense. In reality, though, as a close look at the 2002 Strategy makes clear, the 
just war theory does not expressly appear there. If implicitly raised, the just war 
doctrine therein implied corresponds in no way to the doctrine derived from 
theologians and proponents of natural law. It seems, rather, that the new position of 
the United States revives the distinction established by the Covenant of the League of 
Nations between licit and illicit war. The war waged by the United States in Iraq must 
be justified on the basis of the first theory (a licit war), or, if that argument cannot be 
made out, as justified by necessity. 
B. The Foundations of the New American Security Doctrine 
The new American security doctrine has advanced the just war argument to 
preventive self-defense, but the just war concept has no legal foundation. It rests only 
78. Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence and Incoherence in Article 51 of 
the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J. L. & Pua. POL'Y 539, 552 (2002) ("Waiting for an aggressor to 
fire the first shot may be a fitting code for television westerns, but it is unrealistic for policy-makers 
entrusted with the solemn responsibility of safe-guarding the well-being of their citizenry."); P. Rambaud, 
La Definition de /'agression par /'Organisation des Nations Unies, R.G.D.I.P. 878 (I 976). Rambaud 
states: 
Id. 
The use of modem weapons of mass destruction implies an adaptation of military strategy, 
which can greatly make room for the preventive self-defense concept, the anticipated 
destruction of enemy forces sometimes being the condition for the effectiveness of a 
country's defense. Obviously the definition of aggression is powerless to resolve the 
controversy. 
79. Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., Our Cause is Just: An Analysis of Operation Iraqi Freedom Under 
International Law and The Just War Doctrine, 2 AVE MARIA L. REV. 65, 77 (2004). According to Falvey, 
[t]he doctrine of anticipatory self-defense becomes increasingly important in this age of 
weapons of mass destruction. The devastating potential of such weapons, the swiftness of 
Id. 
their delivery, and their covert capability ( e.g. suitcase bombs, vials of toxic chemical or 
biological agents, infected persons) makes waiting for a strike suicide, not self-defense. 
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on a moral foundation. 80 The only legal foundations that could support preventive self-
defense are the antiquated distinction between licit and illicit war and the concept of 
state of necessity. 
I. The Just War Doctrine 
The medieval Christian just war doctrine81 first appeared with Ambrose (330-397), 
who believed that defending the Empire from barbarians and defending the faith were 
indistinguishable from each other.82 Later, in The City of God, Saint Augustine (354-
430) proposed criteria for a just war.83 The war must be waged only in case of 
necessity and its exclusive aim must be to restore peace. The medieval just war 
concept reached its fullest development with Bernard de Clairvaux (1091-1153), 84 and 
it was later referred to by numerous writers. 85 
In international law, the theory was utilized by the Spanish Jesuit theologian 
Francisco de Suarez (1548-1617) and later by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). In Grotius' 
principal work, Dejure belli ac pacis (The Law of War and Peace), first published in 
1625, this Dutch lawyer further refined the canon-law distinction between just and 
unjust wars. 86 According to Grotius, injustices are identified by natural principles, and 
then must be redressed by just wars. 
Understood in this way, is a war just solely because it responds to injustice, a 
concept as ill-defined and elusive as the new threats, like terrorism, which confront us 
today? Although the notion of a just war derives from moral and philosophical 
considerations, the doctrine does specify two criteria essential to a just war. First, a 
war is just when it occurs after an injustice committed by a state against an important 
state interest of another state that cannot be redressed because of the inability of 
international law to impose a peaceful solution to the conflict. In other words, a war 
Id 
80. See id. at 67. Falvey argues: 
This just war doctrine reflects the classical Catholic perspective regarding the necessity of 
politics serving moral ends, and it advances the concept of war as a form of politics, which 
must serve some moral end. In this regard, the just war doctrine reflects the moral judgment 
that the State, having a monopoly on coercive power and use of force, has the obligation to 
defend the common good. 
81. In the Old Testament, the idea of a just war is based on three principles: the first is the divine 
justification of wars as the religious reinterpretation of God's promise of unwavering support for his people. 
In other words, wars are those of God. See I Samuel 18; I Samuel 17: 25; I Samuel 28. The second is that 
a just use of force includes the destruction of everything that belonged to the defeated party. See Joseph 
6; Joseph 21. Finally, the third principle is that just violence coexists with unjust violence; namely violence 
against innocents. The idea of a just war is not foreign to Judaism, Islam, or Buddhism. On the concept of 
just war in religion, see generally Michel Dion, L 'Ideal de paix et le concept de gue"e juste: entre la meta-
norme, la dialectique et la recherche de solutions humanists, 4 7 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE ou DROIT 263 
(2003). 
82. See generally, AMBROSE DE OFICIIS (Ivor J. Davidson trans., Oxford U. Press 2001). 
83. See AUGUSTINE, CITY OF Goo (Marcus Dods trans., Modem Library 1993). 
84. See, e.g., BERNARD DE CLAIRVAUX, ON THE LoVE OF Goo (Mowbray 1982). 
85. See, e.g., MARTIN LUTHER, DISPUTATION OF DoCTOR MARTIN LUTHER ON THE POWER AND 
EFFICACY OF INDULGENCES (NetLibrary 2001). 
86. See generally HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS (James Brown Scott ed., Francis w. Kelsey 
trans., Oceana Pub. 1964). 
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is just only upon the failure of all peaceful means of obtaining satisfaction. Viewed in 
the light of this requirement, the new security doctrine propounded by the United 
States cannot be justified by use of the just war doctrine. This is so for two principal 
reasons. 
The first reason is the timing of a just war as compared to an action of preventive 
self-defense. A just war is undertaken after an injustice has been committed and thus 
is similar to traditional self-defense. Indeed, self-defense, as incorporated into the 
U.N. Charter, is a response to an armed attack, to violence that has already occurred. 
The use of force in traditional self-defense, therefore, always occurs "after," just like 
in a just war. Thus, Louis Le Fur considers that "in international law, one should say 
'just war,' just as one says 'self-defense' in criminal law .... "87 According to the just 
war doctrine, then, self-defense is a just cause for war. 88 Because intervention occurs 
at clearly different times, one before and the other after an unjust act of violence, 
however, preventive action and just war are not alike. The first is a response to 
potential violence; the second to real violence which has already taken place. 
Moreover, the different temporal sequence of responsive action indicates that these two 
doctrines are really pursuing different objectives. 
It seems, however, that one aspect of U.S. doctrine, ignoring the difference just 
described, is to base itself on the just war doctrine in order to provide moral 
justification for new U.S. security strategy. An example is the manifesto of February 
2002 of sixty leading American intellectuals called What We Are Fighting For, which 
places the war against terrorism within the traditional context of a just war. 89 The 
National Security Strategy of the United States, however, does not itself suggest that 
the U.S. is relying on the theories of preventive self-defense or just war. Nor does it 
seek to justify preventive self-defense by conflating it with the just war theory. 
The second requirement for a just war concerns the preliminary matter of an 
attempt to obtain satisfaction by peaceful means. In his address to the nation on March 
17, 2003, President Bush refers to this requirement, declaring: "For more than a 
decade, the United States and other nations have pursued patient and honorable efforts 
to disarm the Iraqi regime without war .... Our good faith has not been retumed." 90 
On the one hand one might wonder if the Bush administration had undertaken 
reasonable efforts to negotiate the disarmament oflraq with the Iraqi regime. On the 
other hand, President Bush also advanced the idea that it is appropriate to prevent the 
Iraqi regime from acquiring and developing weapons of mass destruction. According 
87. Dion, supra note 81, at 277. 
88. Id. 
89. Letter from the Inst. for Am. Values, What We're Fighting For, (Feb. 2002), available at 
http://www.americanvalues.org. The letter's title is inspired by a series of documentaries made in the 
l 940's by Frank Capra at the request of President Franklin Roosevelt, in order to lead the American 
population, strongly attached to isolationism, to support an intervention against the Nazis. These 
documentaries were entitled 'Why We Fight.' Among the authors of the 2002 letter are Francis Fukuyama 
and Samuel Huntington. This is not surprising since, "Huntington is not just any author, but rather an 
'organic intellectual' ... whose research and teaching are financed by the John M. Olin Foundation, one 
of the more conservative foundations . . . that supports the activities of ultra-conservative networks .... " 
Bernard Sionneau, Reseaux conservateurs et nouvelle doctrine americaine de securite, 4 A.F.R.l 33-34 
(2003). 
90. George Walker Bush, Address to the Nation (Mar. 17, 2003). 
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to Grotius in the The Law of War and Peace, however, it has never been acceptable in 
the law of nations for a state to use force to weaken another state whose power is 
growing based on the fear that one day that state may be in the position to harm the 
state taking the preventive action. 91 
The doctrinal distinction between just and unjust wars has never been enacted into 
positive law, even if we consider the views of one commentator that Article 51 
sanctions the use of force when a State has 'just cause' because it has been attacked, 
even though Article 51 does not explicitly refer to "the vague doctrine of just war.',92 
Some have used this to argue that when a State has a 'just' cause, it may use force in 
self-defense. 93 "In this way, the just war has been resurrected to justify the use of force 
in situations not contemplated by the Charter.',94 
2. The Distinction Between Licit and Illicit War and the 
Theory of State of Necessity 
The men of law succumbed to the eternal temptation of the jurist; they sacrificed 
substance to form. They introduced into the law ofnations the distinction between 
legal and licit wars. A war unjust in its causes may nevertheless be licit if it is carried 
on by a sovereign prince and preceded by a declaration of war . . . the dogma of 
unlimited sovereignty killed the theory of just war.95 
Preventive self-defense, even if based on a broad interpretation of the just war 
doctrine, would still be lacking a legal foundation. The events of September 11, far 
from compelling us to look ahead, compel us instead to look back. The legal 
foundation for the American theory of preventive self-defense seems to be based on 
the international law of the past-the distinction made by the Covenant of the League 
of Nations between two types of war (licit and illicit) and the theory of state of 
necessity. 
The jurist's temptation to favor form over substance is formalized in Articles 10 
through 15.8 of the Covenant of the League ofNations, with its distinction between 
licit and illicit war.96 The just war theory was replaced by that of the licit war. A war 
whose causes are unjust is still a licit war if it is waged by sovereign and preceded by 
a declaration of war. It seems as if the United States has taken note of this distinction. 
For instance, a U.S.-led war to defend a right "which by international law is solely 
within the domestic jurisdiction" 97 of a state, such as national security, is a licit war. 
The United States also invokes the theory of state of necessity when it advances 
the pressing matter of national security, as it did in the aftermath of the attacks on 
91. See generally Louis Le Fur, Gue"e juste et juste paix, 26 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL PUBLIC [R.G.D.I.P.] 268 (1919). 
92. John Dugard,lntemational Te"orism and the Just War, 12 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 21, 23 (1977). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. VISSCHER,supranote37,at 19. 
96. Illicit wars are: wars of aggression; wars launched before the 3 month deadline after the adoption 
of a Council report, or the pronouncement of an arbitral or legal decision; wars initiated before their 
justifications have been submitted to a pacific procedure; wars directed against a State. League ofNations 
Covenant art.s 10-15. 
97. Id. at art. 15 .8. 
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September 11. A state that invokes the state of necessity "argues for the existence of 
an interest so essential that the State must deviate from its obligation to respect a 
subjective law determined by another State, since such respect would be incompatible 
with safeguarding its interests." 98 
The United States first recognized the argument of necessity during the Caroline 
Incident of 183 7, thought by the International Law Commission to be an illustration 
of the "plea of necessity at a time when the law concerning the use of force had a quite 
different basis than it has now. "99 During this incident, 100 Canadian insurgents who had 
taken refuge in the United States equipped a ship, the Caroline, with the aid of 
American citizens, with a view to returning to Canada to assist the rebellion. Informed 
of these facts, the Canadian government dispatched a contingent of British troops to 
American territory, which after a successful operation, destroyed the ship and sent it 
over Niagara Falls. Following the protest of U.S. Secretary of State John Forsythe, the 
British Minister in Washington, Henry Fox, invoked the necessity of self-defense and 
self-protection. The incident was resolved in 1842 after an exchange of notes between 
the new Secretary of State Daniel Webster and the British Minister. In a letter to the 
British government dated April 24, 1841, Secretary of State Webster stated the 
conditions for justifying an action based on necessity. Webster defined "necessity" as: 
a necessity of self defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and 
no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to show, also that the local authorities of 
Canada, even supposing the necessity of the momen_t authorized them to enter the 
territories of the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the 
act justified by the necessity of self defence, must be limited by that necessity and 
kept clearly within it.101 
The Caroline doctrine established that a nation may use force in self-defense only 
if the force is both necessary and proportional. 102 Necessity requires that force must 
be in response to an armed attack or imminent threat of attack, and there is no alterna-
tive means to resolve the situation. 103 The International Court of Justice considered the 
requirements for a state of necessity in its 1997 decision in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
case. 104 According to the Court, an "essential interest" of a state taking action under 
this doctrine must be in conflict with the state's international obligations. 105 A "grave 
and imminent peril" must threaten the essential interest; the action must be the "only 
means" to safeguard the interest; and the action must not "seriously impair" an 
98. This is the definition given by Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur of the International Law 
Commission in Eighth Session (Addendum) of Roberto Ago on State Responsibility, [1980) 2 Y.B. Int'I 
L. Comm'n 18, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/Add.8. 
99. U.N. Int'I L. Comm., Report of the International Law Commission, 196 U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Aug. 
10, 2001). 
100. See generally R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938). 
IOI. Letter from Daniel Webster to Henry s. Fox (Apr. 24, 1841), in 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATES 
PAPERS, 1840-1841, at 1137-38 (1857). 
I 02. Martin A. Rogoff & Edward Collins, Jr., The Caroline Incident and the Development of 
International Law, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 493,498 (1990). 
103. Id. 
104. (Hung. V. Slovk.), 19971.C.J. 92 (Sept. 25). 
105. Id. 
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essential interest of the state owed the obligation. 106 Lastly, the state taking action must 
not have contributed to the emergence of the state of necessity. The Court stated that 
"Those conditions reflect customary international law."107 Thus, four conditions are 
commonly identified for a state of necessity. First, an essential interest of a sate must 
be involved; second, this interest must be threatened by a grave and imminent peril; 
third, the use of force must be the only means of countering this peril; and finally, 
"necessity can never be invoked to justify an act that does not comply with inter-
national obligations if this act seriously harms an essential interest of the state owed 
the obligation." 108 
Were the conditions for a state of necessity present when the Bush administration 
invoked preventive self-defense? Throughout 2002, what essential American interest 
was threatened by Iraq? Security? The survival of its population? Was the use of 
force that began on March 20, 2003, the only means to prevent Iraq from develop'ing 
or employing weapons of mass destruction? The answers to these questions is clearly 
no. But even if a state of necessity had existed it cannot be used to create indirectly a 
new exception to the fundamental rule which prohibits of the use of force. 109 
In reality, the United States has always had a very broad conception of self-
defense, considering that it has the right to intervene with force any time the life or 
property of an American citizen is directly or indirectly threatened in another country. 
But we need to assess the impact of the current American position on international law. 
We have to ask whether the new U.S. strategy, that of the world's principal power, 
might drastically alter international law itself. 
3. The Influence of a Political Doctrine on the Development of International Law 
It is not a rare thing for States ... seeking ... to consolidate ... their security, to 
formulate their views or announce their line of conduct in a declaration cast in more 
or less solemn doctrinal terms. Authors are inclined to deny that such declarations 
have any legal effect in the international order. History shows, however, that the 
positions so taken, though political in their motives and in their unilateral character, 
have had an influence, sometimes considerable, on the formation and application of 
international law.110 
The history of international law itself demonstrates how and to what extent 
political doctrines can influence the evolution of international law when a particular 
state occupies a special place on the international stage. The influence of a political 
doctrine on international law depends of course on the degree of power held by the 
state whose conduct is governed by that political doctrine. 
Thus, Catherine H's statement of policy in her Declaration of Armed Neutrality 
in 1780 formed the basis for the League of Armed Neutrality and led to the adoption 
of the Paris Declaration in 1856. The Declaration of Paris derived from the need of 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at ,J 52. 
108. Theodore Christakis, Vers une reconnaissance de la notion de guerre preventive? in 
L'INTERNVENTION EN IRAK ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 9, 38 (Karine Bannelier et al. eds., 2004). 
109. Id. 
110. DE VISSCHER, supra note 37, at 163. 
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France and Great Britain, engaged at the time in war with Russia, to change their 
traditional practices with respect to maritime capture. The Declaration of Paris 
responded to the liberal ideas of the period, favoring the commercial freedom of 
neutrals and distinguishing between war, a state endeavor, and commerce, an 
individual matter. The legal rules enunciated in the Paris Declaration were in effect 
nothing more than the adoption of the political principles contained in Catherine H's 
Declaration. 
Although in a way different from Catherine H's declaration of policy, the political 
principle of balance of power has also played a role in the shaping of international law. 
The balance of power principle is based on an understanding among states that power 
must be divided in such a way as to produce a balance of forces. This principle was 
implicitly formulated in the Treaties of Westphalia of 1648. Later, the Concert of 
Europe again institutionalized the old balance of power idea. 111 The balance of power 
doctrine had the effect of promoting the observance of treaties, respect for the 
independence of small states, and the development of rights of neutrality. The balance 
of power doctrine contributed to the development of international law by assuring a 
climate of moderation through the maintenance of peace. 
Other doctrines formulated by states, such as the Calvo Doctrine, 112 have also had 
repercussions on international law. The Calvo Doctrine, first enunciated by Argentine 
diplomat Carlos Calvo, was described by Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs Luis 
Maria Drago as: 
an inherent qualification of sovereignty that no proceedings for the execution of a 
judgment may be instituted or carried out against it, since this manner of collection 
would compromise its very existence and cause the independence and freedom of the 
respective government to disappear ... that the public debt cannot occasion armed 
intervention, nor still less, the actual occupation of the territory of American nations 
by an European power. 113 
This principle still remains relevant today. 
The United States has also influenced international law by its formulation of 
political doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine, for example, highly political in nature 
because of its basis in national security concerns, challenged important principles of 
international law. This doctrine, enunciated by President Monroe in an address on 
December 2, 1823, was based on two important principles: non-colonization and non-
intervention. The principle of non-colonization was still unknown to international law, 
even at the end of the nineteenth century; but less than fifty years later it was 
recognized by international law. It would be correct to think that the Monroe Doctrine 
played a role, direct or indirect, in this recognition. With respect to non-intervention, 
the Monroe Doctrine distinguished between political and non-political interventions, 
a distinction which has later taken on importance for international law. 114 
111. The balance of power, however, changed progressively after 1880, due especially to the rise of 
nationalism in the nineteenth century. 
112. See Percy Bordwell, Calvo and the "Calvo Doctrine," 18 THE GREEN BAG 377 (1906). 
113. Bordwell, supra note 113, at 377-78. 
114. Charlemagne Tower, The Origin, Meaning and International Force of the Monroe Doctrine, 14 
AM. J. INT'LL. I, 16-17 (1920) ( "[I]t is not an act oflegislation, neither does it call for legislative authority 
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Any political doctrine of the United States has a real potential to significantly 
influence international law because the United States has always occupied a privileged 
place on the international stage. This place of privilege confers a particular authority 
on its doctrines. From this perspective, American approval of the doctrine of 
preventive self-defense threatens to overturn existing principles of international law. 
That is why U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan said of the new United States strategy 
that it: 
represents a fundamental challenge to the principles on which, however imperfectly, 
world peace and stability have rested for the last fifty-eight years. My concern is that, 
if it were to be adopted, it could set precedents that resulted in a proliferation of the 
unilateral and lawless use of force, with or without justification. 115 
The U.S. is also taking a great risk, for any precedent created by its practice will 
also be available, "like a loaded gun, for other states to use as well." 116 The U.S. has 
worked against the preemptive use of force since 1945.117 A precedent of preemptive 
self-defense "would provide legal justification for Pakistan to attack India, for Iran to 
attack Iraq, for Russia to attack Georgia, for Azerbaijan to attack Armenia, for North 
Korea to attack South Korea, and so on." 118 
It may therefore not be in the best interests of the United States to question 
positive international law. And in fact the United States may not really be seeking to 
challenge existing international law as such. In the past the United States has been 
opposed to a right of preemptive self-defense "because it has found the U.N. Charter 
rules to be in its interest as a matter of policy and prudence .... [I]t is not in the 
interest of the United States to reconstruct the law of the Charter so as to dilute and 
confuse its normative prohibitions. " 119 
Even though the United States does not want to provoke a "dissolution" of the 
Charter, nevertheless it is exploiting its ambiguities and weaknesses. The new U.S. 
security strategy in effect approves a doctrine that clearly violates the prohibition of 
preventive self-defense contained in Article 51 of the Charter. 
4. American Practice Violates the Charter's Prohibition of 
Preventive Self-Defense 
Why is the United States not at all reluctant today to contemplate the possibility 
of preventive self-defense, even though for Nguyen Quoc Dinh, a leading French 
international lawyer of the last generation, ''the principle prohibiting preventive self-
from Congress to give it the formal and legal sanction of the United States Government as a mode of 
procedure, or of a process subject to judicial determination and enforcement as the law of the land."). 
115. Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary General, Address to the U.N. Gen. Assembly (Sept. 23, 2003), 
available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/sg2eng030923. 
116. MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L., THE MYTH OF PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE 19 
(2002), available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf. 
117. Id at 15. 
118. Id at 19. 
119. Id. at 15-16 (quoting LoUIS HENKIN, USE OF FORCE: LAW AND U.S. POLICY, IN MIGHT V. RIGHT, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 69 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1989)). 
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defense unquestionably derives from the Charter." 120 It must be recognized, however, 
that even if the prohibition of preventive self-defense does derive from the Charter, 
there is still room for discussion. Its prohibition is not absolute and is on the contrary 
somewhat relative. This relativity is derives from the fact that the Charter has not 
outlawed self-help. It only gives the appearance of having done so. Moreover, even 
if preventive self-defense is prohibited by international law, we must not forget that 
this prohibition only results a contrario from the Charter. 
First, self-help was only seemingly outlawed. In fact, by including in Article 51 
"the inherent right ofindividual ... self-defense," the authors of the Charter admitted, 
by the adjective "inherent," "that such a right already existed in customary law before 
its recognition by United Nations law."121 The qualifier "inherent" endows self-
defense with an autonomous existence, independent of any agreement, treaty, or even 
the Charter. Self-defense is an important concept in legal communities where the 
protection of rights is an exclusive function of the state and where, therefore, members 
of the community are prohibited from resorting to self-help. 122 In those communities 
self-defense is an exception to this prohibition. 123 In the international legal system, the 
right of self-defense under Article 51, as an inherent right, represents an exception to 
the prohibition against self-help. Consequently, Article 51 may be said to contain 
within itself the theory of preventive self-defense. 
Nevertheless, many scholars make a distinction between self-help and self-
defense. The distinction is based on the difference in the structure of societies. Self-
defense exists only in "organized" societies, and self-help only in "primitive" 
societies. 124 But these structural differences seem tenuous and exaggerated. And to 
view international society as an organized society is clearly an idealistic act. Inter-
national society is, for the most part, still weakly structured, despite the U .N. Charter's 
attempt to centralize questions concerning the use of force in the Security Council. 
One commentator considers that because of the frequent use of self-defense by 
states, self-defense approximates a common law practice which has become assimilated 
into the idea of self-help. 125 It seems, however, that self-defense, instead of merging 
into self-help, is itself an element of self-help. Thus, in providing for self-defense, 
120. Nguyen Quoc Dinh, La Legitime defense d'apres la Charle des Nations Unies, 52 R.G.D.1.P. 241 
(1948). 
121. Pierre Marie Dupuy, La Communaute internationale et le terrorisme, in LES NOUVELLES MENACES 
CONTRE LA PAfX ET LA SECURITE INTERNATIONALES 35, 37 (2004). 
122. Nguyen, supra note 120, at 241. 
123. Id. 
124. CHRISTIAN ALIBERT, DU DROIT SE FAIR JUSTICE DANS LA SOCIETE INTERNATIONALE DEPUIS 1945, 
in LIBRARJRE GENERALE DE DROIT ET DE JURISPRUDENCE 701 (1983). Alibert argues: 
Id. 
A Member of a society whose existence is threatened can react to an attack with force. This 
right of defense, very largely recognized in an unorganized society, is much more limited 
in an organized society .... If they can seek justice, that is to say, have recourse to self-
protection or to self-help in a primitive society, in an organized society they must seek 
justice from the competent authorities .... In internal societies, the right to self-protection 
has long been replaced by the right of self-defense; in international society, this 
transformation, which is a real revolution, is recent. It dates back to 1945. 
125. Id. 
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Article 51 did not eliminate self-help, but merely made it into an exception. As Louis 
Le Fur stated in 1932 with respect to the Covenant of the League ofNations: 
If a state's right to self-help is generally condemned today and if all recourse to 
armed force is rejected ... there is nevertheless one case where this right continues 
to be recognized and will always be, as it has been between individuals: this is the 
case of self-defense. 126 
Second, the Charter's prohibition of preventive self-defense is not stated 
explicitly, but only a contrario. What bars the use of force is the requirement of 
anteriority. 127 A state can never use force before being the victim of an armed 
attack-only after. Article 51 might be epitomized in these terms, as well as the 
prohibition of preventive self-defense in international law. Ifa state decides to make 
preventive attacks against another state because it feels threatened, it becomes an 
aggressor, because ''the aggressor is the one who attacks first, the one who employs 
armed force rather than some other form of pressure or constraint not entailing the use 
of armed force or the threat of such force." 128 
Two questions remain. First, why can international law not recognize the right of 
preventive self-defense? Second, does the absence of an express prohibition of 
preventive self-defense by the Charter explain why the United States recognizes the 
right to use such force in its internal documents? 
As for the first question, Hans Kelsen has advanced the notion that international 
law does not accept the extension of the doctrine of self-defense to include preventive 
self-defense because of the impossibility of objective fact-finding regarding the alleged 
illegal situation. 129 Only the existence of a tribunal with compulsory jurisdiction could 
support the extension of the doctrine of self-defense, without such extension becoming 
a remedy worse than the evil itself. 130 
As for the second question, it seems that the only factor motivating the United 
States to assert a right to make preventive attacks is a change in political doctrine 
linked to the ideas of the current administration, with economic stakes playing a major 
role in the new policy. 
In sum, the United States has claimed a right to a use of force that is barred a 
contrario by the U.N. Charter and has been clearly rejected by key organs of the U.N. 
system, such as the International Court of Justice and the Security Council. It would 
appear then that to the United States, the theoretical foundations for the use of this 
force (just war, necessity, etc.) matter little. On the symbolic level, the recognition of 
use of force for preventive self-defense is just as revolutionary as was the prohibition 
of the use of force in the U.N. Charter in 1945. The U.S. position undermines the entire 
126. Louis-Erasme Le Fur, Developement historique du droit international, 41 R.C.A.D.I. 501,535 
(1932). 
127. Giraud, L 'interdiction du recours a la force, la theorie et la pratique des Nations Unies, R.G.D.I.P. 
514 (1963) (''The concept of anteriority is the cornerstone of every system that outlaws resort to the use of 
force and authorizes self-defense."). 
128. Id. at 517. 
129. CECILE TOURNA YE, KELSEN ET LA SECURITE COLLECTIVE 87-88 ( 1995). 
130. Id.; see also Oscar Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule a/Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 259,267 (1989) 
("[T]he line between violations and emerging law may be difficult to draw, made more difficult by the 
absence of judicial authority and the great disparities in power in the international community."). 
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edifice erected by the Charter, reminding us that, even today, international law is a 
body oflaw highly resistant to systematization. As Charles de Visscher has observed, 
international law is not susceptible to systematization because "value judgments have 
not acquired in international law the degree of firmness and concentration which is the 
motor of any efficient systematization. " 131 
Perhaps international law resists systematization because the international 
community places little value on the rule oflaw. According to one view, in an organic, 
integrated society, or even in a homogeneous society governed by a developed legal 
system, power sides with the rule oflaw, and respect for the rule oflaw is considered 
an essential value. That is the situation within states. But "in the contemporary inter-
national community, with concern for respect for the rule of law non-existent or 
relegated to the background, governments that possess power are essentially motivated 
by political considerations that lead them to take positions both in compliance with and 
in opposition to the rule." 132 
II. MULTilA TERAL ( OR FRENCH) PREVENTIVE ACTION 
During the negotiations before the Iraq war, the French position was that the 
Security Council has the "monopoly on preventive armed force" 133 and that it must 
expressly authorize the use of force. Although France recognizes only multilateral 
preventive action, it has innovated in the last few years in accepting a broadening of 
the concept of self-defense. However, this broadening is not to be confused with 
unilateral preventive self-defense. 
A. Security Council Monopoly on Preventive Armed Force 
The Security Council has the monopoly on the use of preventive armed force by 
virtue of its responsibility under the U.N. Charter to maintain international peace and 
security. France and the other European states referred to this responsibility in the 
security strategy that they adopted in May 2003. 
1. Primary Responsibility of Security Council for International Peace and Security 
Article 24 of the United Nations Charter recognizes that the Security Council has 
the primary responsibility for the maintenance ofinternational peace and security. This 
means that it falls primarily to the Security Council to decide whether and under what 
conditions force is to be utilized in a given situation. Before authorizing the use of 
force, however, the Security Council must first determine that there has been a threat 
to the peace pursuant to Article 39 of the Charter. Article 39 states: "The Security 
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall 
be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international 
peace and security." 134 
131. Charles De Visscher, Methodes et systeme en droit international, 138 R.C.A.D.I. 75, 77 (1973). 
132. Giraud, supra note 127, at 542. 
133. Christakis, supra note 108, at 15. 
134. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
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By virtue of this article, only the Security Council can determine that a situation 
qualifies as a threat to the peace, and it possesses broad discretion in determining 
whether there exists a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of 
aggression. 135 This broad discretion is important because a threat to the peace may not 
necessarily be characterized by military operations, as would be the case with an act 
of aggression or a breach of the peace. Article 39, pursuant to which the Security 
Council may find that there is a threat to the peace, also authorizes it to take measures 
to maintain or to restore international peace and security. This means that, even in the 
absence of an armed attack, and confronted only with a threat to international peace 
and security, the Security Council can intervene militarily in a country. The Security 
Council is accorded this power because it is entrusted with the task of maintaining 
international peace and security. It is for this reason that the Security Council 
authorized the use of force in Somalia and Haiti, although no act of aggression had 
been committed with respect to those countries. 136 
In fact, Resolution 1441 on Iraq refers to this authority of the Security Council. 
The Resolution mentions the "serious consequences" that Iraq would face were it to 
continue to fail to fulfill its obligations. 137 The mention of "serious consequences" 
implies the possibility of a use of military force against Iraq, which the Security 
Council, of course, would already have decided. When it authorizes the use of force 
the Security Council uses a clear and unambiguous formula, such as "The Security 
Council authorizes States to use all necessary means to [attain certain definite objec-
tives]."138 
The United Sates cannot substitute itself for the Security Council, as Kofi Annan 
pointed out in the following terms: 
When States decide to use force, not in self-defense but to deal with broader threats 
to international peace and security, there is no substitute for the unique legitimacy 
provided by the United Nations Security Council. States and peoples around the 
world attach fundamental importance to such legitimacy, and to the international rule 
oflaw. 139 
Described as the keystone of the collective security system, 140 the Security Council 
centralizes the use of force, a power delegated to it under Article 24(1) by U.N. 
member states. It has been pointed out, however, that while the U.N. Charter gives the 
Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
135. See generally B. Conforti, Le Pouvoir discretionnaire du Consei/ de securite en matiere de 
constatation d'une menace contre la pabc, d'une rupture de la pabc ou d'un acte d'agression, in LE 
DEYELOPPEMENT DU R6LE DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE: PEACE-KEEPING AND PEACE-BUILDING 51 (1992). 
136. On Somalia, see S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992). On Haiti, see S.C. Res. 940, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994). 
137. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 25, ,i 13. 
138. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 794, supra note 136, ,i 10. See also S.C. Res. 1491, fl 10-13, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1491 (July 11, 2003) ( concerning enforcing peace agreement in former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 1264, 
,i 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (Sept. 15, 1999) (concerning human rights violations in East Timor). 
139. Press Release, Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary General (Feb. 8, 2003), available at www.un.org/ 
News/Press/docs/2003/sgsm8600.doc.htm. 
140. See K. Hemdl, Reflections on the Role, Functions and Procedures of the Security Council of the 
United Nations, 206 R.C.A.D.I. 289 ( 1987). 
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security, it does not give it exclusive authority in this area. Thus, states may still have 
recourse at times to the use of force without authorization from the Security Council. 
Thomas Franck was certainly not exaggerating when he said that "the Charter itself 
provided enough ambiguities to open the rules to deadly erosion." 141 But the use of 
force by states outside the U.N. framework is clearly illegal, in contrast to use of force 
which is authorized by the Security Council. 
The unlawfulness of war, established by the U.N. Charter, does not exclude the 
legitimate use of force . . . [I]t is clear that the difference between war and the 
legitimate use of force is not a formal difference that can be obscured by simply 
manipulating words .... The difference is essential and resides in the guarantee that, 
in contrast to war, the legitimate use of force serves no partisan interest .... Thus the 
difference is similar to that between justice and vengeance or between law and fact: 
each is a negation of the other and is defined by this negation. By its very nature war 
is a disproportionate and uncontrolled use of force ... [T]he use of force authorized 
by the Charter is only that which is strictly necessary . . . for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 142 
By its unfavorable view of the Iraq war, France has expressed its commitment to 
the system established by the U.N. Charter. France reiterated its support for the 
Charter system through its participation in the adoption of the new European Security 
Strategy. 
2. Adoption of a European Security Strategy and the Role of the Security Council 
During a non-official meeting at Rhodes on May 3, and 4, 2003, close to a month 
and a half after the start of the Iraq war, the European Council charged Javier Solana, 
the European Union's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, to prepare a first draft of a European Union security strategy. Adopted on June 
20, 2003, at Thessalonika, the strategy was entitled "A Secure Europe in a Better 
World." 143 
For the first time in its history, the European Union (EU) had a security strategy. 
The decision has been described as "historic and unexpected because it put an end to 
the existing taboo on strategic thinking at the EU level." 144 The EU's strategy however, 
did not either directly or indirectly disrupt the collective security system, since it 
merely reaffirmed the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of 
international peace and security and its authority to take preventive action toward that 
end. Thus, any approval given to the doctrine of preventive self-defense by the fifteen 
EU member states during June, 2003, only confirmed the Security Council's traditional 
role. This position can be explained by the deep commitment of European states, 
including France, to multilateralism. This is evident in the Thessalonika strategy, when 
141. Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2 (4)? 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 809 (1970). 
142. Le Tribunal Permanent des Peuples, Le Droit international et /es nouvelles gue"es, 36 REVUE 
BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.B.D.1.) 249, 256 (2003) (Belg.). 
143. European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World, 17 (EC) June 20, 2003, available at 
ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms _ Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/76255 .pdf. 
144. Sven Biscop & Rik Coolsaet, Une Strategie de/ 'UE pour la securite: definir la voie europeenne, 
59 DEFENSE NATIONALE 125, 125 (2003). 
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it states: "We need to build an international order based on effective multilatera-
lism."145 Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, speaking for the EU at the U.N. 
General Assembly on September 23, 2003, reiterated its position regarding the U.N.: 
"Finally, should all political and diplomatic measures fail, recourse to enforcement 
measures provided for by the United Nations Charter cannot be ruled out." 146 Europe 
has a common culture of multilateralism; and European states are all very much 
committed to international organizations and to collective defense. 
In developing their new security strategy, France and the European states 
approved nothing really new and disturbed nothing presently existing. They only 
reaffirmed that the Security Council has a monopoly on preventive action and that it 
never implicitly authorizes the use of force. 
B. Recognition of the Security Council's Exclusive Right to Expressly Authorize 
the Use of Force 
The U.N. Charter provides that the Security Council may act directly (Articles 39, 
42, and 43) 147 or it may authorize a regional organization to act (Article 53).148 The 
United States and its European allies, wishing to legitimate their preventive actions in 
Iraq, have added a third possibility, which goes under the name of"implicit authoriza-
tion."149 France, however, made clear that in its view, Security Council authorization 
had to be explicit. According to Professor Corten: 
Although it is difficult to define it precisely, [the argument of implicit authorization] 
consists in justifying coercive military action undertaken against a state even though 
the conditions for self-defense have not been satisfied and the Security Council has 
not expressly authorized it in a prior resolution. By "express authorization," we mean 
the formulations traditionally used, which consist in authorizing states "to use all 
necessary means" ... with a view to achieving certain defined objectives. Lacking 
any use of these terms, "an implicit authorization" might hypothetically be deduced 
from the Council's behavior, either during or even after the military operation had 
been undertaken. 150 
This argument was used several times in the past by the United States to justify 
recourse to force, but went largely unnoticed until the third Gulf War. As invoked by 
the United States, it is a testament to the Anglo-American coalition's desire to fit the 
145. European Council, supra note 143, at 6. 
146. U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 7th plen. mtg. at 31, U.N. Doc. A/58/PV.7 (Sept. 23, 2003) (statement 
by the Prime Minister ofltaly, H.E. Silvio Berlusconi, on behalf of the European Union). 
147. U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42, 43. 
148. U.N. Charter art. 53. 
149. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland to the U.N. Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/350 (Mar. 20, 2003) (expressing its position on 
U.S. preventive action); Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the U.N. Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/351 (Mar. 20, 2003). 
150. Olivier Corten & Francois Dubuisson, L 'Hypothese d'une regle emergente fondant une 
intervention militaire sur une 'autorisation implicite' du Conseil de securite, 104 R.G.D.l.P. 873, 876 
(2000). 
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Iraq war into the U.N. framework. 151 France has rejected such a construction: legality 
under the U.N. Charter cannot be implied. It must be expressly affirmed. 
The theory of"implicit" Security Council authorization for the use of force was 
first advanced by the United States at the time of the Cuban quarantine. 152 In the 1990s 
it resurfaced to justify certain military operations in Iraq undertaken by the United 
States and the United Kingdom after the cease-fire of 1991. There were the operations 
Provide Comfort and Southern Watch, whose official objective was to establish 
security zones in Iraqi Kurdistan so as to encourage the return of civilians who were 
trapped in the mountains bordering Turkey as they fled the repression of Saddam 
Hussein's regime.153 Shortly afterwards, the United States and the United Kingdom 
invoked Iraqi violations of Resolutions 687 and 678 to justify other incursions. The 
"implicit"authorization argument was again used at the time of the so-called 
"Presidential Palaces" crisis, which was resolved by the signing of a Memorandum of 
Understanding between Iraq and Secretary General Kofi Annan and by Security 
Council Resolution 1154.154 On December 16, 1998, following a negative report of 
UNSCOM chief Richard Butler, Operation Desert Fox was launched. The United 
States and the United Kingdom justified the operation by a reference to a sentence 
fragment contained in Resolution 1154, according to which "any violation [ of 
Resolution 687] would have severest consequences for Iraq." 155 Finally, during the 
Kosovo crisis the "implicit" authorization argument was made on the basis of Security 
Council Resolutions 1160, 1199, and 1203,156 and from the persistent refusal of 
Yugoslav authorities to comply with them by putting an end to acts of violence against 
the Albanian community in Kosovo. In fact, those three Security Council Resolutions 
approved ofno coercive measures against Yugoslavia, with the exception ofan arms 
embargo.157 
After having undertaken preventive action in Iraq, the United States attempted to 
bring this action within the framework of international law. The justification for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom revolved around one Security Council Resolution: Resolution 
151. See, e.g., President George W. Bush's speech before the United Nations General Assembly: 
The Security Council was right to be alarmed. The Security Council was right to demand 
that Iraq destroy its illegal weapons and prove it had done so. The Security Council was 
right to vow serious consequences if Iraq refused to comply. And because there were 
consequences, because a coalition of nations acted to defend the peace, and the credibility 
of the United Nations, Iraq is free .... 
U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 7th plen. mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. A/58/PV.7 (Sept. 23, 2003). 
152. See Carten & Dubuisson, supra note 150 at 879. 
153. Id. The intervening States considered that in Resolution 688, of April 5, 1991, the Security Council 
had given authorization, perhaps implicit, but authorization none the less, for a resort to force. However, 
"absolutely nothing in the text of Resolution 688 permits a reading that the Security Council would, for the 
first time in its history, have authorized a military intervention in the territory of a State not determined to 
be the first aggressor." Id. at 879. 
154. Memorandum of Understanding signed by Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, and Kofi 
Annan, United Nations Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/1998/166 (Mar. 27, 1998); S.C. Res. 1154, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1154 (Mar. 2, 1998). 
155. S.C. Res. 1154, supra note 154, ,i 3. 
156. S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. Doc. SIRES/I 160 (Mar. 31, 1998); S.C. Res. I 199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 
(Sept. 23, 1998); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (Oct. 14, 1998). 
I 57. S.C. Res. 1160, supra note 156, ,i 8. 
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144 l.158 This Resolution did not authorize the use of force, but rather allowed the 
allies to find a legal basis for the use of force of March 20, 2003, by its referral to other 
Resolutions. In this Resolution, the Security Council 
Decides . . . to afford Iraq . . . a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament 
obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set 
up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified 
completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and 
subsequent resolutions of the Council.159 
Finally, it stated "that the council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious 
consequences as a result of continued violations of its obligations." 160 On November 
13, 2002, Iraq accepted the terms of Resolution 1441; on November 25 the first 
UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors arrived in Baghdad; and on December 7, Iraqi 
authorities submitted a declaration of over 12,000 pages regarding their arms 
programs. The stated objective ofResolution 1441 was to oversee Iraq's disarmament. 
The Iraqi regime was supposed to cooperate for this purpose. But, according to the 
Anglo-American coalition, Resolution 1441 contained two other important elements. 
The first was that Iraq had violated Resolutions 687 and 678. The second was that the 
Resolution did not explicitly provide that the Security Council was alone competent 
to authorize the use of force in case the Resolution was violated. 
As for the first element, the Permanent Representative of the United States to the 
United Nations sent a letter to the President of the Security Council on March 20, 
2003, addressing the question of the legal basis of the military action just launched 
against Iraq. His letter stated that "the actions being undertaken are authorized under 
existing Security Council resolutions including resolution 678 (1990) and 687 
(1991 ). " 161 Security Council Resolutions 678 and 687, therefore, authorized the Anglo-
American coalition to intervene militarily in Iraq. These Resolutions imposed a number 
of obligations on Iraq, the most important of which was the obligation to disarm. The 
coalition considered that these Resolutions had not been respected and that, 
consequently, their violation should entail the "severest consequences," according to 
the formulation of the Security Council. These consequences were a military 
intervention. 
As for the second element, the Anglo-American coalition asserted that Resolution 
1441 did not expressly provide that the Security Council had the sole authority to use 
force against Iraq. 162 Paragraph 4 of the Resolution stated only that "false statements 
158. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 25. 
159. Id., 'ff 2. 
I 60. Id., 'ff I 3. 
161. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, 
U.N. Doc. S/2003/351 (Mar. 20, 2003). The United Kingdom advanced the same argument, in a Letter from 
the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United 
Nations, U.N. Doc. S/2003/350 (Mar. 20, 2003). 
162. On this issue, Oliver Corten maintains that: 
The Council ... obviously does not need to specify in its resolutions that it is the only 
competent body to authorize use of force. This competency derives from the United Nations 
Charter itself and in fact, supposing the Council wished so, could not be questioned by the 
Security Council, which still submits to the United Nations constitution. 
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or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq ... will be reported to the Council 
for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below." 163 Or in any case that 
is how the Anglo-American coalition wanted to interpret Resolution 1441. 164 
When the United States advanced this argument to support the proposition that the 
Security Council had given it an implicit authorization to use force, it also implied that 
the Security Council had delegated enforcement power to it. Because the Security 
Council lacked real enforcement capabilities, the United States and its allies would 
undertake that task on its behalf. According to this view, the United States was an 
agent acting on behalf of all humanity. 165 At least that is how the United States hoped 
that the world community would interpret its acts. This is in fact how it presented the 
war in Iraq. 
France opposed this position because such a view would endanger the health of 
the collective security system; it would authorize states to use force unilaterally and to 
avoid bringing the matter to the Security Council. 166 This would produce a situation 
just like that during its final days when "the League of Nations was no longer 
consulted, its isolation attesting to the fact that although the Covenant system was still 
formally in force, it was no longer a reality." 167 
It is this very same risk that today weighs on the system established by the United 
Nations Charter. That is why it is necessary ''to establish a common basis from which 
we might talk seriously about implicit authorization or approval." 168 How should we 
determine what factors are sufficient to constitute an "implicit" authorization? What 
are those factors? Is it enough that the Security Council has determined that there is a 
threat to international peace and security? Or must there be a Resolution containing a 
finding of illegality? 
France explained its position in a joint statement with China and Russia, in which 
it seeks to be true to the mission assigned by the Charter to the Security Council: 
Oliver Corten, Operation Iraqi Freedom: peut-on admettre I 'argument de /'autorisation implicite du 
Consei/ de securite? 36 R.B.D.I. 205,212 (2003) (Belg.). 
163. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 25, ,i 4. 
164. For example, speaking for the United Kingdom, the Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith stated that: 
Resolution 1441 would in terms have provided that a further decision of the Security 
Council to sanction force was required if that had been intended. Thus, all that resolution 
1441 requires is reporting to and discussion by the Security Council of Iraq's failures, but 
not an express further decision to authorize force. 
Attorney General Lord Goldsmith, Legal Basis for Use of Force Against Iraq (Mar. 17, 2003), 
http://www.numberlO.gov .uk/output/Page3287 .asp. 
165. This coincides with the concept of a "new manifest destiny," found in the neo-<:onservative 
philosophy. Created by the journalist John Louis O'Sullivan in 1845 and revived by the neo-conservative 
Ben Wattenberg in the 1990s, this concept means that "America is a unique experience, a real laboratory 
of progress in matters of freedom and democracy; this being so, Americans have the moral duty to allow 
the rest of the planet to benefit from this, such is their manifest destiny." Bernard Sionneau, supra note 68 
at 5 I 2 (2003). 
166. Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that ''the temptation to return to a unilateral resort to the use of armed 
force is today a strong tendency in international society." Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Le droit international 
a la recherche de ses valeurs : paix, developpement, democratisation, 286 R.C.A.D.l. 17, 19 (2000). 
167. Emile Giraud, L 'Interdiction du recours a la force, la theorie et la pratique des Nations Unies, 
67 R.G.D.I.P. 501,528 (1963). 
168. Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, L 'Autorisation par le Conseil de securite de recourir a /a force: une 
tentative d'evaluation, 106 R.G.D.I.P. 5, 44 (2002). 
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Resolution 1441 (2002) adopted today by the Security Council excludes any 
automaticity in the use of force .... In the case ofa failure by Iraq to comply with its 
obligations, the provisions of paragraphs 4, 11 and 12 will apply. Such failure will be 
reported to the Security Council .... It will then be for the Council to take a position 
on the basis of that report. Therefore, the resolution fully respects the competence of 
the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, in 
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. 169 
Security Council Resolution 1441 was adopted only because the Council's 
permanent members thought that only the Security Council would be able to intervene 
in case Iraq failed to fulfill its obligations. On this point,the United States and the 
United Kingdom had in fact given a prior guarantee that the text of the Resolution 
would not sanction the unilateral use of force. The U.S. Representative had stated this 
clearly: "As we have said on numerous occasions to Council members, this resolution 
contains no 'hidden triggers' and no 'automaticity' with respect to the use of force. If 
there is a further Iraqi breach ... the matter will return to the Council for discussions 
as required in paragraph 12." 170 The U.K. Representative confirmed this under-
standing: "There is no 'automaticity' in this resolution. If there is a further Iraqi breach 
of its disarmament obligations, the matter will return to the Council for discussion as 
required in paragraph 12." 171 
Thus, French President Jacques Chirac stated on March 10, 2003: 
And the international community, unanimously, by voting for Security Council 
Resolution 1441, made a decision that amounts to saying: ''we are going to disarm 
Iraq by pacific means, that is to say through inspections. We will name inspectors, 
and it is they who will tell us if this direction is possible or not. " 172 
President Chirac's statement was echoed in the French press: 
Resolution 1441 neither says nor implies that any State, even the most powerful, can 
claim the right to determine unilaterally that Iraq has again failed to fulfill its 
obligations, and to unleash at will the "serious consequences" with which that country 
was rightly threatened if it continued to defy the international community, or to 
determine the means to be employed [if those grave consequences should be 
unleashed]. 173 
The reason for this is that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security belongs to the Security Council. That having been said, 
however, France has not been reluctant to reshape certain concepts of international law, 
one of which in particular is creating major problems today. Although France has been 
a defender of the role of the Security Council in deciding on military intervention and 
169. Press Release, Embassy of France in the United States, Iraq-Joint Statement by the People's 
Republic of China, France and the Russian Federation (Nov. 8, 2002), available at http://www.info-france-
usa.org/news/statmnts/2002/iraq 111302.asp. 
170. U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4644 (Nov. 8, 2002). 
171. Id. at 5. 
172. Interview by Patrick Poivre d' Arvor and David Pujadas with Jacques Chirac, President offrance, 
in Elysee Palace, Paris, France (Mar. I 0, 2003), available athttp://www.info-france-usa.org/news/ tatmnts/ 
003/chirac _ irak03 I 003.asp. 
173. Alvain Pellet, L 'Agression, LE MONDE, Mar. 23, 2003. 
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thus a defender of multilateral preventive action, it has nevertheless innovated by 
broadening the traditional concept of self-defense. 
C. Recognition of a 'Broadened' Notion of Self-Defense 
France has broadened the traditional notion of self-defense, first by enlarging the 
concept of armed attack, one of its key elements, and second by its intervention in the 
Ivory Coast. 
I. The Enlargement of the Concept of Armed Attack 
France accepted the broadening of the concept of armed attack when, in agreement 
with the American position, it decided to regard the September 11 terrorist attacks as 
an armed attack. The resulting definition reshapes the nature of armed attack in 
international law. An armed attack no longer involves two states, but rather can 
involve one state and a group of private individuals. The strictly interstate context in 
which armed attack had traditionally been conceived has been exceeded. 
It was during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, undertaken in the 
context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), that France first 
recognized the broadening of the concept of armed attack. "What is an alliance? 
Essentially promises of aid in case of aggression." 174 A promise that NATO kept. On 
September 12, 2003, for the first time in its history, at the initiative of its then 
Secretary General, the Briton George Robertson, the alliance invoked Article 5 of its 
mutual defense treaty. 175 In his farewell address, Mr. Robertson described the moment 
when NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time. He stated: 
We sat there on 12 September 2001 and invoked Article 5 of our founding Treaty 
which many had to read in detail for the very first time .... We did it in 5 1/2 hours 
and loudly told the US we all stood with them, told the world that we were deadly 
serious, and told the terrorists that they had crossed a line which even the Soviets had 
not dared to do. 176 
So, on September 12, 2003, the nineteen NATO members demonstrated that they 
shared the United States' vision that: 
174. Maurice Bourquin, Le Probleme de la securite internationale, 49 R.C.A.D.I. 469,525 (1934). 
175. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization states: 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if 
such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective 
self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the 
Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other 
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures 
taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such 
measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary 
to restore and maintain international peace and security. 
North Atlantic Treaty, art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, available at http://www.nato. 
int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm. 
176. Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, Farewell Speech to the Council (Dec. 17, 2003), 
available at httpJ/www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s03 l217a.htm. 
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If it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, 
it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which 
states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them aJl.177 
Article 5 deals with armed attack. In invoking it, the members of the Atlantic 
Alliance accepted that the terrorist acts of September l 1 constituted an armed attack, 
even though these acts were committed by individuals. NATO thus included terrorist 
acts with the concept of armed attack. Henceforth, acts of private individuals are 
possible grounds for the exercise of the right of self-defense. It has been noted that 
there are some precedents for the use of self-defense to justify the use of armed force 
against terrorists. 178 This was the first time, however, that self-defense was "presented 
as the primary weapon in the fight against terrorism, without on the whole having met 
with strong criticism or general disapproval." 179 
This leads to equating terrorist acts with a sort of indirect armed attack, a view that 
was first given systematic expression in a Soviet draft presented at the League of 
Nations Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments of 1933.1.80 
Amended by a seventeen-member committee concerned with questions of security, 
presided over by Nicolas Politis, this draft became the Convention for the Definition 
of Aggression, also known as the Politis Report. 181 It defines indirect aggression as 
"support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of 
another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take, in 
its own territory, all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance 
or protection." 182 This concept of indirect aggression was accepted later by the U.N. 
General Assembly in its Resolution entitled Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among States183 and in Article 3(g) of its 
"Definition of Aggression" Resolution of 1974.184 The latter Resolution states that: 
"Sending armed bands, groups, i"egulars or mercenaries by or on behalf of a State, 
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount 
to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein." 185 
177. Press Release, NATO, Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12, 2001), reprinted in 40 
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1267, 1267, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm. 
178. Joe Verhoeven, Les 'Etirements 'de la legitime defense, 3 A.F.R.I. 50 (2002). 
179. Id. 
180. This project was sometimes called Project Litvinov, named after the Soviet Foreign Minister who 
championed it. 
181. The Politis Report was not, however, the object of a convention. But regarding the definition of 
aggression, this act has nevertheless received a large measure of approval within the Committee where all 
great powers were represented. 
182. Convention for the Definition of Aggression art. 2, para. 5, July 3, 1933, 147 L.N.T.S. 52, available 
at http://www.letton.ch/lvx_33da.htm. 
183. "Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts 
of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory 
directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve 
a threat or use of force." Declaration on Principles oflntemational Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 
at 123, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
184. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), at 143, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 19, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
185. Id. 
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The concept of indirect aggression, which has been recognized by France, 
broadens the definition of self-defense under Article 51 by expanding the meaning of 
the term "armed attack." From now on, even if France does not recognize a right to 
unilateral preventive self-defense, it is in agreement with the United States on one 
important point-that the constituent elements of the traditional concept of self-defense 
as recognized by international law are subject to redefinition. The intervention of the 
French army in the Ivory Coast on November 6, 2004, provides an empirical example. 
2. French Army Intervention in the Ivory Coast 
Around 3:00 p.m. on November 6, 2004, Ivorian armed forces loyal to President 
Laurent Gbagbo, during the course of an aerial bombardment of rebel positions, struck 
a French army barracks in Bouake. 186 French forces reported that nine people were 
killed and about twenty injured. 187 In reaction to the attack, France ordered the 
destruction of the Ivorian air force. 188 Jean-Francois Bureau, spokesman for the French 
Ministry of Defense, stated that France "had responded in a situation of legitimate 
defense." 189 The French army claimed a right of self-defense because it had been 
attacked in Bouake on November 6, and also because it felt itself threatened during the 
movement ofits troops from the northern part of the country. Moreover, it invoked a 
state of "broadened self-defense" for the protection of civilians, especially French 
civilians, and their property in Ivorian territory. 190 French forces took over road 
intersections in armored cars, and gunboats guarded bridges in an attempt to stop 
rioting. 191 
The concept of"broadened self-defense" has no legal basis in international law. 
It is a French theory intended to justify French intervention. In arguing for a 
broadened notion of self-defense, France has demonstrated that even if it does not 
accept the doctrine of unilateral preventive self-defense out ofrespect for the existing 
system oflaw, it does however accept a concept of self-defense that is not recognized 
by international law. In so doing, France itself invalidates some ofits own arguments. 
In the final analysis, states do not have ideals or progressive ideas. These are the 
province of civil society. States merely follow their interests, and from these interests 
flow different interpretations of the U.N. Charter, a document ceaselessly confronted 
with the infidelities of the parties to it. 
CONCLUSION 
Several questions still remain unanswered: Why do France and the United States 
not perceive new threats to international peace and security in the same way? Why are 
186. Ivory Coast Mobs Clash with French, November 7, 2004, available at: http://www.cnn.com/linkto/ 
netscape.html. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. France Attacks Ivoirian Airbase, November 6, 2004, http:!/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3988769.stm. 
190. France limits Ivory Coast Pullout, November 8, 2004, available at: http://www.cnn.com/ 
WORLD/africa/11/07/ivory.coast/index.html. 
191. See Troops Move to End Ivoirian Riots, November 7, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
africa/3989941.stm. 
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these two states still divided on problems of international security and the advisability 
of military intervention, as in Iraq? In other words, what do we believe is the source 
of legal obligation? According to J.L. Brierly, ''we believe that legal obligation 
obligates us because we believe that the world is a cosmos, an organized whole. 
Inevitably, all ofus will never see the organization's details in the same way." 192 
Inevitably, the United States and France will not see the details of the international 
system in the same way. We can only take note of our differences in perception and in 
our ways of dealing with new threats to the peace, and expose them, confront them, 
attempt to justify them, and understand them. We can never hope to eliminate them. 
From the Franco-American crisis and the position of each state on the Iraq 
question we can take away at least one lesson: the revolution promised by the 
prohibition of the use of force by Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter has not occurred 
because one of its exceptions was poorly drafted. It must be explained to future 
generations that the United Nations collective security system was defective because 
Article 51 of the Charter was badly written. 
The revolution has not occurred, but this does not threaten the existence of 
international law or foreshadow its disappearance.For the present, however, we should 
think hard about these matters, as did heads of state from around the world on 
September 14, 2005, at the United Nations in New York. These inquiries should give 
rise to the ambitious idea ofrewriting the Charter, not simply that ofreforming U.N. 
bodies. We should not fear change, because, as we all know ''what is least new under 
the sun of the international lawyer is constant change in the law." 193 
192. J.-L. Brierly, Le Fondement du caractere obligatoire du droit international, 23 R.C.A.D.l. 463, 
549 (1928). 
193. P. Weil, Toujours le meme et toujours recommence: /es themes contrastes du changement dt de 
la permanence du droit international, in ECRITS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 8 (2000). 
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